

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04508 01 OF 02 161308Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00

OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00

CU-02 NEA-10 /090 W

----- 055242

O R 161150Z JUN 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3760

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VALLETTA

USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 4508

NOFORN

EO: 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG

SUBJ: CSCE: PERIPHERAL PROBLEMS -- YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA, MALTA,
CYPRUS

REF: GENEVA 4275 NOTAL

1. SUMMARY: WITH THE SOLUTIONS TO MOST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04508 01 OF 02 161308Z

CSCE NOW EMERGING, AND WITH PRESSURES GROWING FOR A DECISION ON

THE POSSIBILITY OF A STAGE III SUMMIT IN JULY, THE TROUBLESOME PERIPHERAL ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN A FEATURE OF THE CONFERENCE SINCE THE OUTSET LOOM UP AS POSSIBLE OBSTACLES ON THE ROAD TO THE SUMMIT. THIS TELEGRAM GIVES OUR CURRENT APPRAISAL OF THE MMST PROMINENT OF THESE PROBLEMS, IN ORDER OF INCREASING DIFFICULTY, AND REACHES THE CONCLUSION THAT THE MOST COMPLEX AND DELICATE IS THE QUESTION OF CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION AT STAGE III, THE SOLUTION OF WHICH IS MOST DIFFICULT TO FORESEE. WE BELIEVE THE OTHER PROBLEMS WILL -- MORE OR LESS -- TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES, BUT BELIEVE THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD URGENTLY CONSIDER WHETHER THE QUESTION OF CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION CALLS FOR USG ACTION, AND IF SO, WHAT THAT ACTION SHOULD BE. END SUMMARY.

2. YUGOSLAV PROPOSALS ON MINORITIES -- THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS MENTION THIS SUBJECT UNDER THE CULTURE AND EDUCATION SUB-HEADINGS OF BASKET III. THE YUGOSLAVS, NOTING THAT THEIRS IS A NATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES, HAVE MADE IT A SINE QUA NON FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO CSCE. HOWEVER, LANGUAGE ON NATIONAL MINORITIES CAUSES GREAT DIFFICULTIES FOR MANY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE RESTIVE NATIONAL GROUPS, AND THEY HAVE STUBBORNLY RESISTED YUGOSLAV PROPOSALS. A LONG IMPASSE HAS ENSUED, AND AT THE MOMENT THERE IS NO EASY SOLUTION IN SIGHT. HOWEVER, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE PLAYED A GENERALLY REASONABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN PREVIOUS SITUATIONS OF THIS KIND, AND WE BELIEVE THEIR OVERALL INTEREST IN A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE WILL LEAD THEM TO AGREE TO A COMPROMISE IN THE END. ARRIVING AT SUCH A COMPROMISE IS BASICALLY A DRAFTING PROBLEM, AND SHOULD BE MANAGEABLE.

3. ROMANIAN INTEREST IN FOLLOW-UP AND NON-USE OF FORCE-- THE ROMANIANS, WHO HAVE PLAYED A SOMETIMES DANGEROUSLY INDEPENDENT GAME IN CSCE, DESPERATELY WANT CONFERENCE APPROVAL OF THEIR NON-USE OF FORCE PROPOSAL, AND A COMMITMENT TO PERIODIC FOLLOW-UP, AS PART OF THEIR EFFORT TO ESTABLISH A BASIS FOR LATER LEVERAGE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. THEY HAVE APPARENTLY DECIDED THAT THE BEST TACTIC TO USE IN OBTAINING THEIR OBJECTIVES IS TO WITHHOLD AGREEMENT ON KEY POINTS OF IMPORTANCE TO OTHER DELS UNTIL THEY SHOW GREATER FLEXIBILITY ON ROMANIAN DESIDERATA. THE LIST OF ROMANIAN RESERVATIONS IS NOW SO LONG THAT MOST DELEGATES HAVE LOST TRACK. HERE AGAIN, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT, PROVIDED THE ROMANIANS OBTAIN SOME MEASURE OF SATISFACTION ON THE PRINCIPLE POINTS OF IN-

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04508 01 OF 02 161308Z

TEREST TO THEM, THEIR OVERALL DESIRE FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE WILL PREVAIL, AND THEY WILL COMPROMISE ON OTHER POINTS. FROM THE ROMANIAN VIEWPOINT THEIR PRINCIPLE OPPONENTS ARE THE FRG, WHICH IS STILL EVIDENTLY TRYING TO BREAK UP THE ROMANIAN NON-USE OF FORCE PAPER, AND THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE SHOWN ABSOLUTELY NO FLEXIBILITY THUS FAR ON FOLLOW-UP. A LITTLE FLEXIBILITY FROM THESE TWO DELEGATIONS WOULD EASE THE ROMANIAN FRONT CONSIDERABLY.

4. THE MALTESE PROPOSAL -- THE MALTESE PAPER IS THE JOKE OF THE CONFERENCE, BUT NO ONE REALLY LAUGHS ABOUT IT. MINTOFF'S IDEAS ABOUT FEDERATION WITH THE ARABS AND WITHDRAWAL OF US AND SOVIET FLEETS FROM THE MEDITERRANEAN ARE SO FAR BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE CONFERENCE -- AND SO ABSURD -- THAT THERE IS OF COURSE NO POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING ACCEPTED. THE CHANCES THAT MINTOFF WILL HANG ON UNTIL THE LAST MINUTE IN ORDER TO MAKE A SPLASH DEPEND ON HOW ISOLATED HE FEELS HIMSELF. IF HE KNEW THAT HE WAS COMPLETELY ALONE, WE SUPPOSE THAT HE WOULD WITHDRAW, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT BEFORE THE ELEVENTH HOUR. UNFORTUNATELY, HOWEVER, ITALY AND A FEW OTHER MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES ARE SLIPPING TOWARD THE IDEA OF OFFERING MINTOFF A FACE-SAVING COMPROMISE, PROBABLY BASED ON SOME RELATIONSHIP FOR THE NON-PARTICIPATING MEDITERRANEAN STATES WITH CSCE FOLLOW-UP. WHETHER THE MALTESE PROBLEM IS RESOLVED BY SUCH A COMPROMISE OR BY A LAST MINUTE MALTESE WITHDRAWAL, WE BELIEVE THAT MINTOFF WILL GO ALONG IN THE END.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 GENEVA 04508 02 OF 02 161258Z

53

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00

OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02

SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05 BIB-01 ERDE-00

CU-02 NEA-10 /090 W

----- 055134

O R 161150Z JUN 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3761

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
USMISSION NATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 4508

NOFORN

5. CYPRIOT REPRESENTATION -- THE TURKS OBJECT TO THE PRESENCE OF MAKARIOS AT STAGE III, AND WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY IS REPRESENTED IN THE CYPRIOT DELEGATION AND HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR THE CYPRIOT REPRESENTATIVE'S SPEECH. THE TURKS HAVE NO GREAT LIKING FOR CSCE, AND ARE QUITE CAPABLE OF TAKING AN UNYEILDING POSITION ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE ANNOYED AND BAFFLED BY THE TURKISH ATTITUDE, WESTERN DELEGATIONS ARE UNWILLING TO TURN THEIR BACKS COMPLETELY ON THE TURKS, FOR FEAR OF ENCOURAGING THEM
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04508 02 OF 02 161258Z

TOWARD THEIR ARAB OPTION, OR TOWARD SEEKING THE HELP OF THE SOVIETS. BUT MOST DELEGATES HERE ALSO ASSUME THAT MAKARIOS WILL WANT VERY MUCH TO GO TO STAGE III, AND THAT DISSUADING HIM FROM DOING SO WOULD BE MOST DIFFICULT AND POLITICALLY DANGEROUS. DISCUSSION OF THE CYPRIOT PROBLEM IS LARGELY TABOO HERE; IT IS CONSIDERED A HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL AFFAIR FOR CAPITALS, AND IN ANY CASE THIS ISSUE IN CSCE HAS NOT YET REALLY BEEN JOINED. YET THERE IS A UNIVERSAL ANXIETY OVER HOW THIS PROBLEM CAN BE RESOLVED, AND A GENERAL WESTERN APPREHENSION THAT THE SOVIETS WILL TRY TO RESOLVE IT IN ORDER TO OPEN THE WAY TO A SUMMIT, THUS DEMONSTRATING THEIR ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN A COUNTRY WHICH IS USUALLY THOUGHT OF AS FALLING WITHIN THE WESTERN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

6. OBVIOUSLY, IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR EVERYONE IF THE PARTIES CONCERNED COULD WORK OUT A SOLUTION BY THEMSELVES, FOR EXAMPLE THROUGH AGREEMENT BEFORE STAGE III ON SOME FORM OF JOINT INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN NICOSIA. BUT THE PARTIES CONCERNED DO NOT APPEAR INCLINED OR ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A SOLUTION THE TURKS COULD VERY WELL BLOCK CONSENSUS ON A DATE FOR STAGE EEE. IT IS ALSO OBVIOUS THAT THE US SHOULD NOT GET INVOLVED IN WHAT LOOKS LIKE A NO-WIN SITUATION. NEVERTHELESS, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD COMPLETELY BLOCK THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING STAGE III, WE HAVE REFLECTED ON WHAT COULD CONCEIVABLY BE DONE, AND WHO COULD DO IT. THE OPTIONS SEEM TO BE TWO: DISCOURAGING MAKARIOS FROM GOING, OR DISCOURAGING THE TURKS FROM OBJECTING TO HIM. ONE, OR BOTH, OF THESE OPTIONS COULD BE PURSUED BY PARTIES WHICH MIGHT HAVE SOME INFLUENCE ON THE SITUATION. WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO JUDGE THE ULTIMATE RIGIDITY OF EITHER MAKARIOS OR THE TURKS, BUT OUR INCLINATION WOULD BE TO DISCREETLY PROBE BOTH SIDES TO DETERMINE WHICH OPTION MIGHT OFFER THE BEST PROSPECT OF SUCCESS. THIS MIGHT BE DONE IN COOPERATION WITH THE UK: THE BRITISH PROBE MAKARIOS WHILE WE PROBE THE TURKS, ENCOUR-

AGING BOTH PARTIES TO TAKE A REASONABLE APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE.
(IT IS ALSO JUST POSSIBLE THAT SOME MINOR POWER SUCH AS YUGOSLAVIA,
ROMANIA, SPAIN OR FINLAND AS STAGE III HOST COULD PLAY A USEFUL
HONEST BROKER ROLE.) WHILE WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC FOR AN EASY SO-
LUTION, A UK-US PROBING EFFORT COULD SOFTEN THE GROUND AND HELP
TO REVEAL ANY POSSIBILITIES WHICH MAY EXIST FOR COMPROMISE. IN-
VOLVING THE UK AT THIS TIME MAY LAY THE GROUND FOR AN EVENTUAL EF-
FORT BY THEM WITH MAKARIOS, IF THIS PROVES ADVISABLE. IF THE DE-
PARTMENT JUDGES THAT THIS IS INDEED A PROBLEM REQUIRING ACTION OF
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04508 02 OF 02 161258Z

SOME KIND, WE WOULD URGE THE BEGINNING OF A PROBING EFFORT AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE, SINCE OTHERWISE THE SOVIETS MAY UNDERTAKE IT THEM-
SELVES.DALE

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, NONAGGRESSION, SUMMIT MEETINGS, POLITICAL SITUATION, BASKET III, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 JUN 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: CunninFX
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975GENEVA04508
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750208-1161
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750648/aaaabreb.tel
Line Count: 241
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 GENEVA 4275
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 30 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <30 APR 2003 by ElyME>; APPROVED <29 SEP 2003 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: PERIPHERAL PROBLEMS -- YUGOSLAVIA, ROMANIA, MALTA, CYPRUS
TAGS: PFOR, XG, CY, RO, CSCE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006